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STATE ACTORS IN AN INTERNATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE*

Bruce Broomhallt
I. Introduction
The question of whether and how to define the crime of terrorism is
one that raises a series of intriguing and difficult questions: intriguing,
because the international community has been devoting unprecedented
attention to the categorical condemnation of this (undefined) crime; and
difficult, because efforts to define terrorism seem destined perpetually to
evoke the most volatile, partial, and situation-driven of State sensitivities.
The following brief discussion argues that recent endeavors at the
international level to establish a comprehensive definition of terrorism raise
serious concerns from a human rights perspective. It argues, moreover, that
greater efforts must be made to ensure that any results emerging from these
negotiations take into consideration their impact on existing principles of
international humanitarian law (hereinafter "IHL") as well as on the
progressive advancement of international human rights standards and
principles. Without such an approach, an internationally sanctioned
definition of terrorism may run contrary to tendencies that have recently
defined the development of international law, increasing rather than
reducing incoherence in the international system. Such a definition would
raise more problems than it resolves.
While there is good reason to undertake a human-rights based analysis
of existing or proposed definitions of the crime of "terrorism" under the
national law of various jurisdictions, this paper examine efforts at the
international level. At the time of writing, the United Nations remains in the
midst of an uncertain process to negotiate what is referred to as a
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.' In the context of
* Presented at the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at Case
Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox International
Law Center, on Friday, Oct. 8, 2004. The author thanks the Symposium Co-Chairs,
Professor Michael Scharf and Lt. Col. Amos Guiora, as well as the staff of the Cox Center
and Case Western School of Law for organizing the event.
t Professor of international criminal law and Director of the Centre for the Study of
International Law and Globalization, Department of Law, University of Quebec at Montreal.
The author's reflections on the link between the definition of terrorism and the protection of
human rights was prompted in part by Kent Roach, Professor of Law at the University of
Toronto. See KEN ROACH, SEPTEMBER 11: CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA 21-46 (2003).
' See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by GeneralAssembly resolution 51/210
of 17 December 1996, G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GOAR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc.
A/57/37 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Ad Hoc Committee Report] (offering the various texts that
as of 2004 continue to form the basis of the negotiations).
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these negotiations, 'comprehensive' implies both the fact that the proposed
convention would supply a definition that encompasses effectively all acts
that might be characterized as terrorism, adopting a unified approach in
place of the fragmentary or sectoral one that has characterized previous
international action, and the fact that the proposed convention would
provide a broad and inclusive framework for the regulation of terrorism,
including mechanisms for prevention, for policy-coordination, and for
repression through criminal, financial, immigration, and other
administrative means.
Both the scope of the definition itself and the various means provided
for its suppression through a Comprehensive Convention call for analysis
from the perspective of ensuring consistency with and wherever possible
enhancing the protection of international human rights standards. A wide
range of internationally-recognized human rights have come under
increasing pressure in the face of national and international "counterterrorism" measures, with a consequent increase in efforts to ensure that
States do not take their counter-terrorist campaigns as an opportunity to
weaken or ignore these rights. 2 This tendency to weaken human rights
protection in the name of combating terrorism is so pronounced that the
author of the present piece has grave doubts that present circumstances
would permit the international community to adopt a balanced convention
that strengthened rather than undermined basic rights, but the present piece
proceeds on the assumption that adoption of a Comprehensive Convention
may well be inevitable. At a minimum, efforts to ensure rights protection in
the context of counter-terrorist measures should rigorously be taken into
consideration during the negotiation of Comprehensive Convention both
with respect to its definition and with respect to its jurisdictional,
cooperation, and other procedural mechanisms.
Having said this, the following brief discussion will focus only on the
potential effect on human rights of the scope of application of the
2 For activity within the United Nations system, see Protecting Human Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms While CounteringTerrorism:Report of the Secretary-General,U.N.
GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item 105(b), U.N. Doc. A/59/404 (2004); and Protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism: Study of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Item
105(b), U.N. Doc. A/59/428 (2004). See also Specific Human Rights Issues: New Priorities,
In ParticularTerrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Terrorism and human rights: Final report
of the Special Rapporteur, Ms Kalliopi K. Koufa, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40 (2004). For a sample of the response of leading human rights
organizations, see Amnesty International, Building an internationalhuman rights agenda:
Resisting abuses in the context of the 'war on terror' (2004), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/report2004/hragenda-1-eng (last visited Feb. 21, 2005); and Human
Rights Watch, Anti-terror Campaign Cloaking Human Rights Abuse: New Global Survey
Finds Crackdown on Civil Liberties, (2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2002/01/wr2002.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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prohibition to be adopted in the convention. Specifically, it will address the
question whether the convention, if adopted, should exclude from its
coverage, as is currently proposed, the official actions of State actors. Not
only has this question been one of the main obstacles to the completion of
the negotiations, it also raises fundamental questions about how the
convention will contribute to or detract from the progressive development
of international law with respect to the efforts of the international
community to ensure accountability for serious crimes.
II. A Crime of Terrorism and OtherInternationalCrimes
The claim that the world needs a comprehensive treaty-based
definition of terrorism is based in part on the assumption that international
law somehow fails to prohibit or otherwise to provide sufficient obligations
with respect to the conduct such a treaty would address. Without exploring
every nuance of the question, it might be useful to put the debate into
perspective by sketching in broad strokes the definitional terrain wherein
such a definition would find its place.3
International humanitarian law and the laws and customs applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the law of war crimes, imposes individual
criminal responsibility in apparently complete overlap with any conceivable
definition of acts of terrorism when committed in situations of armed
conflict (as defined by this law as the primary condition of its application).
Thus, the law of war crimes with respect to acts of "terrorism" taking place
in situations of armed conflict is pertinent not just where humanitarian law
instruments explicitly mention terrorism,4 but also with respect to the many
prohibited acts that, if committed with the appropriate intent and purpose,
might be characterized as terrorist (hostage-taking, the using of human
3 For a more in-depth discussion, see Helen Duffy, Interrights, Responding to September

11: The Framework of International Law, at Part IV (Oct. 2001); available at
(last
http://www.interights.org/about/Sept%2011%20Parts%20I-IV.htm#PART%201V
visited Feb. 21, 2005); some of the same arguments will be developed in a wider context in
HELEN DUFFY, THE "WAR ON TERROR" AND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(forthcoming 2005).
4 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 33, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] ("...
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.
. ."); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June8, 1977, art. 51(2), 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] ("...Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited"); Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 4(2)(c) (prohibiting "acts
of terrorism" against persons hors de combat) and 13(2) (spreading terror among the civilian
population), 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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shields, indiscriminate targeting of civilians, etc.).' Whether on the basis of
customary or conventional law, or with respect to international or internal
armed conflicts, this law creates a solid basis for the imposition of
individual criminal responsibility for acts of terrorism committed in the
course of armed conflict.
In addition to the responsibility imposed by the law of war crimes,
international law imposes criminal responsibility upon individuals for acts
that can be characterized as crimes against humanity or genocide. 6 With
respect to these crimes, such responsibility arises both in times of armed
conflict and in times of peace, provided that the essential elements of these
crimes are made out. This means, in brief, that in the case of crimes against
humanity the underlying crimes must be committed in the context of a
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population pursuant to a
State or organizational plan or policy to commit such an attack.7 In the case
of genocide, the underlying crimes must be committed pursuant to a
specific intent to destroy in whole or in part an ethnic, national, racial or
religious group as such.8
Where crimes do not attain the special gravity of genocide, war crimes
or crimes against humanity, however, individual responsibility arises only
under national, and not under international law. Thus, instead of being
viewed as a crime under international law in the sense that genocide or
crimes against humanity is (that is, partaking of the legacy of the
Nuremberg principles and thus giving rise to individual responsibility as a
matter of customary international law), 'terrorism' should be viewed at
5 To select only some examples from the two conventions: Geneva Convention IV, supra
note 4, at art. 147 (grave breaches - "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, ...
wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.... taking of hostages
and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly," if committed against persons or property
protected by the Convention); Additional Protocol I,supra note 4, at arts. 51 (protection of
civilian population), 52 (protection of civilian objects), 53 (protection of cultural objects and
places of worship), 54 (protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population), 55 (protection of the natural environment), and 56 (protection of works and
installations containing dangerous forces).
6 See generally, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW, (2d ed. 1999); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CRIME OF CRIMES (2000); and Antonio Cassese, Genocide and Crimes againstHumanity, in
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, VOL. 1, 335

& 353 (Antonio Cassese et al eds., 2002).
7ROME STATUTE OF THE INT'L CRIM. CT., July 17, 1998, art.7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9,
37
I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome-statute(e).pdf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
8 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter 1948 Genocide Convention] available at
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
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least at present as a catch-all category for a series of crimes within the
domain of "suppression conventions" that regulate various crimes deemed
serious by the international community. Such conventions define the crime
with which they deal (torture, 9 hostage-taking, aircraft sabotage, etc.) 10 and
impose on States Parties the obligation to prohibit the crime within their
domestic jurisdiction (with the breadth of such jurisdiction being typically
prescribed by the treaty), to prosecute offenders (if they are not extradited),
and to cooperate with others in the prevention and suppression of the
targeted acts. In the framework of such "transnational criminal law"
treaties, however, and in distinction to the "international criminal law" of
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, individual criminal

9 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
10There are currently 12 international conventions related to terrorism: Conventions on
Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T.
2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against
the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter 1973
Protected Persons Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 245, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Hostages Convention]; European Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 1137 U.N.T.S. 93, 90 E.T.S. 3; Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 125;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 303; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27
I.L.M 672; Convention on the Making of Plastic Explosives for the purpose of Detection,
Mar. 1, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/653 (1997) [hereinafter
1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention]; International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 408, U.N.
Doc A/54/109 (1999) [hereinafter Terrorist Financing Convention]; And regional
conventions: Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of
Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1986 U.N.T.S. 195; SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of
Terrorism, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/136 (1989). The text of a thirteenth
international convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly on April 13, 2005: see
"General Assembly adopts convention on nuclear terrorism; will open for signature at
Headquarters 14 September", Press Release GA/10340 (April 13, 2005), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/ga10340.doc.htm (verified April 13, 2005); and
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee Establishedby GeneralAssembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996: InternationalConventionfor the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
U.N. Doc. A/59/766 (4 April 2005) (available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/N05/295/27/PDF/N0529527.pdf?OpenElement (verified 13 April 2005)).
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responsibility arises for the proscribed crimes only under national law." I
This makes it essential - if the principle of legality is to be respected - that
governments establish appropriate jurisdiction over the relevant crimes
within their national criminal justice systems - typically through the
adoption of implementing legislation. If governments of States Parties to
such treaties should fail to do so, they might be internationally responsible
for having violated their obligations under a particular treaty, but no
individual could be held criminally responsible for the particular crime in
question without some properly adopted, non-retroactive law being
applicable to their conduct.
Speaking strictly on a definition level, the prohibitions contained in
suppression conventions are needed only to fill 'impunity gaps' in times of
peace (when international humanitarian law does not apply), where the
crimes are not committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against a civilian population pursuant to a plan or policy (as with crimes
against humanity), and where the requisite intent to commit genocide is
lacking. With respect to terrorism, the definitional terrain is clearly fairly
extensively covered by instruments adopted to date, covering as they do
seizure of aircraft and other unlawful acts against civilian aviation, attacks
on internationally protected persons, hostage-taking, acts against maritime
navigation, terrorist bombings and financing, and much more. At the same
time, it bears noting that the 1973 Protected Persons Convention does not
apply to all acts against all officials or to any attacks against civilians' 3 (a
gap only partly filled by the Terrorist Bombings Convention)1 4 and that a
number of acts not covered by the Terrorist Bombings or other international
conventions could cause massive loss to civilian life (poisoning of water
supplies, use of chemical, biological or other weapons of mass destruction
not involving explosives, etc.). Thus, while it is true that existing counterterrorist conventions cover a good part of what might be considered the
most serious crimes of terrorism, some gaps do remain that fuel the efforts
of those who advocate the adoption of a comprehensive definition.
Of course, there is more to the adoption of a Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism than gap-filling on a definitional
level. Clear, treaty-based obligations of suppression conventions - and
particularly the obligation to extradite or prosecute, aut dedere autjudicare
- can provide a powerful normative base that does not always exist (at all,
1 On the distinction between "transnational criminal law" and "international criminal
law", see Neil Boister, 'TransnationalCriminalLaw', 14 EURO. J. INT'L L. 953 (2003).
12 A more detailed discussion of the regime of suppression conventions and their place in
international criminal law is contained in

BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW, Part I

(2003).
131973 Protected Persons Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 1 & 2.
14 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 1 &
2.
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or in clear and accessible form) for crimes under international criminal law.
This is particularly the case with respect to the clear obligations typically
present in suppression conventions to prohibit, to establish jurisdiction
over, and to prosecute or extradite individuals accused of the crimes
concerned. 5
This being admitted, however, the benefit that any new,
comprehensive convention against terrorism might have from the point of
view of the set of uniform obligations it imposed would have to be balanced
against the likely impact from a human rights perspective that international
adoption of any given definition might have.
I1. Recent Efforts to Arrive at a ComprehensiveDefinition of Terrorism
In a process potentially touching the jurisdictions of all United Nations
members States, and not that of an institution like the International Criminal
Court alone, 16 the General Assembly has (through its Sixth or Legal
15

Thus, while grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are subject to an aut dedere, aut

judicare mechanism, crimes related to internal armed conflict and some crimes based only
on customary law of war crimes are not: compare the provisions applicable to situations of
international armed conflict through the four Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocol I with those applicable to non-international armed conflicts: for international
conflicts, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 49 & 50, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 50 & 51, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 129 &130, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, ; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 4 , at arts. 146 & 147; Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, , at arts. 11, 85, 86 &
88; for non-international conflicts, Article 3 common to these four conventions, as well as
the Additional Protocol II, supra note 4, (both of which lack such mechanisms); also
Theodor Meron, International Criminalizationof InternalAtrocities, in WAR CRIMES LAW
COMES OF AGE 248 (Theodor Meron, ed. 1998). Crimes against humanity take no
suppression-convention form, leaving the rules on the exercise ofjurisdiction with respect to
this crime to its (less stringent) bases in customary international law: see the author's own
discussion of this point in BROOMHALL, supra note 12, at 109-112. The same is true of
genocide, since the Genocide Convention does not oblige States other than the territorial one
to exercise jurisdiction over this crime: 1948 Genocide Convention, supra note 8, at art. 6.
16 During the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court in July 1998, States discussed the inclusion of the crime of 'terrorism' within
the Rome Statute, alongside genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and a
definition was proposed. An optional definition of 'crimes of terrorism' was included in the
final Draft Statute produced by the Preparatory Committee: Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., Supp. No. 22A, art. 5, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (1998); reprintedin M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 129 (1998). At the Rome Diplomatic Conference, a definition of
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Committee) charged an Ad Hoc Committee and a Working Group with the
task of drafting a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
The Committee has been examining the question since 1998,' 7 although it
has been unable to conclude these negotiations even under the enormous
political pressure generated by the world-wide response to the destruction
of the World Trade Center and other attacks within the United States on
September 11, 2001, owing mainly to differences over the place of national
liberation and similar struggles, the responsibility of State actors, and the
relationship of the Comprehensive Convention to other counter-terrorism
instruments.' 8 Nonetheless, the work of the General Assembly committees
'act of terrorism', to be included within the definition of crimes against humanity, was
submitted, then later modified: Proposalsubmitted by Algeria, India, Sri Lanka and Turkey,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.l/L.27 ( June 29, 1998); Proposalsubmitted by India, Sri Lanka
and Turkey, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.27/Rev. 1 ( July 6, 1998). As it became apparent
that the proposal did not have the needed support, a 'place-holder' provision was proposed
that would require the Preparatory Commission to elaborate definitions of these crimes later:
Proposal submitted by Barbados, Dominica, India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and
Tobago and Turkey, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.71 ( July 14, 1998). The only result was
the commitment made, in the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference, to re-consider the
definition and inclusion of this crime, along with that of drug-trafficking, at the first Rome
Statute Review Conference (to be held seven years after entry into force, or in 2009): Final
Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiarieson the Establishment
of an InternationalCriminalCourt, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/10, Resolution E, July, 17, 1998.
17The Ad Hoc Committee was established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996 in order "to elaborate an international convention for the suppression of
terrorist bombings and, subsequently, an international convention for the suppression of acts
of nuclear terrorism, to supplement related existing international instruments, and thereafter
to address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions
dealing with international terrorism." G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/210 at par. 9 (1996). The mandate of considering a Comprehensive Convention
on International Terrorism was first assigned to the Ad Hoc Committee in 1998, and has
been renewed annually since: G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/108 (1998) ("as a matter of priority"), G.A.Res. 54/110, U.N. GAOR,
54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/110 (2000), G.A. Res. 55/158, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES55/158 (2001), G.A. Res. 56/88, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/RES56/88 (2002) ("as a matter of urgency"), G.A. Res. 57/27, U.N. GAOR,
57th Sess., U.N. Doc. AIRES/57/27 (2003), G.A. Res. 58/81, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/58/81 (2003), G.A. Res. 59/46, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/46 (2004) ("on an expedited basis"), and has been renewed in subsequent
resolutions. The Working Group of the General Assembly's Sixth Committee was first
called for by G.A. Res. 52/165, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess. U.N. Doc. AIRES/52/165(1998) and
renewed subsequently essentially to accelerate the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, allowing
for negotiations to be held twice instead of only once per year.
18 See 2002 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 1. See also the Committee's
subsequent reports: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly
resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc.
No. A/58/37 ( 2003); Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly
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remains underway (having been widely urged to adopt a Comprehensive
Convention in the near future), 19 and the recent adoption of international
and regional instruments defining terrorism, 20 as well as domestic laws
passed since September 11,21 indicate that (for better or worse) a
comprehensive definition of terrorism may yet emerge.
Such a definition may, as already mentioned, raise a number of
objections from a human rights perspective, serving to legitimate an
expansion of executive and police powers without clearly articulated limits
and in the context of a vaguely-worded and overbroad definition. Some of
the difficulties encountered in trying to craft consensus about a definition
are notorious, such as the place of national liberation struggles in this
context. 22 Other problems are less well-known, and appear to be subject to
resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Supp. No. 37, U.N. Doc.
No. A/59/37 ( 2004). For the work in the Sixth Committee, see Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism. Report of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/56/L.9 (Oct. 29,
2001); Measures to Eliminate InternationalTerrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/57/L.9 (Oct. 16, 2002); Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism: Report
of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/58/L.10 (Oct. 10, 2003); Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism: Report of the Working Group, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/59/L.10 (Oct. 8,
2004).
19UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has made the adoption of a Comprehensive Convention
part of his comprehensive strategy against terrorism and urged the General Assembly to
adopt such a Convention before the end of summer 2006: In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General,
A/59/2005 (March 21, 2005), para.91 at p.26; "Secretary-General congratulates General
Assembly on adoption of international convention on nuclear terrorism", Press Release
SG/SM/9817 (April 13, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/
sgsm9817.doc.htm (verified April 13, 2005). The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change, appointed by the Secretary-General, had shortly before urged adoption of the
Convention: A More Secure World: Our SharedResponsibility (2004), para. 163 at p.52. In
addition, heads of government and others gathered at the Madrid Summit urged "the speedy
conclusion" of a Comprehensive Convention: The Madrid Agenda, adopted by the
International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security ("The Madrid Summit"),
March 11, 2005 (available at http://english.safe-democracy.org/).
20 See Terrorist Financing Convention, supra note 10, at art. 2(1); The Arab Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism, Apr. 22, 1998, arts. 1 & 2; Convention of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, July, 1 1999, arts. 1 & 2;
Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism,
July 14, 1999, arts. 1 & 3; Treaty on Cooperation among States Members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism, June 4, 1999, art. 1.
21 The best source currently available for primary comparison of national laws is the website containing the country reports deposited with the Counter-Terrorism Committee
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001), available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submittedreports.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2005).
22 For a brief discussion of some of the problems, see Terrorism and Human Rights:
ProgressReport preparedby Ms. KalliopiK. Koufa, Special Rapporteur,U.N. GAOR, 53rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/31 (2001).
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wider (perhaps unexamined) consensus in the negotiations to date. These
include the proposed definition's breadth, going causing death and serious
bodily harm to include broadly "[s]erious damage to public or private
property" and "[d]amage ... resulting or likely to result in major economic
loss", with "the purpose ... to intimidate a population, or to compel a
government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any
act".2 3 Not only could such a definition include a far wider set of acts than
are normally considered to compromise 'terrorism' - including many
potentially legitimate forms of protest and resistance - but by including
certain acts committed in armed conflict or in situations of concerted
resistance against oppression - as discussed below - the effects could be
perverse and undesirable as a matter of international public policy.
Adoption of an overbroad definition of terrorism focused exclusively
on non-State actors - as currently envisioned - runs the risk of making a
Comprehensive Convention the inheritor of the dark legacy of the 'national
security' legislation that has leant and continues to lend a veneer of
legitimacy to widespread abuses of human rights in many countries.
Nonetheless, it appears that the international community is determined to
press ahead with the formulation of a Comprehensive Convention. If so and while recognizing that some of the problems arising from the definition
itself, although not discussed in this brief note, also need urgent attention strenuous efforts should be made to ensure that the debate concerning
crimes by State actors be resolved in a principled and fair way.
IV Can State agents commit terrorism?
In the negotiations that have taken place on a Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism under the auspices of the United
Nations, one major point of contention has been whether such a convention
should exclude itself from regulating the actions of State agents and should
instead encompass only non-State terrorists. This issue of the intended
target rationepersonae of the definition to be established has proven to be
one of the most enduring issues of the negotiations. It is an issue with
potentially serious consequences for the effectiveness and the very
legitimacy of the Convention.
While public discourse about terrorism frequently focuses on nonState actors, the possibility that State agents might directly or indirectly
support or perpetrate acts of terrorism is something that a number of States
feel has to be included in a Comprehensive Convention. The United States

See "Informal texts of articles 2 and 2bis of the draft comprehensive convention,
prepared by the Coordinator", 2002 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 1, at Annex II,
art. 2(l)(b-c).
23
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and its supporters,2 4 however, insist that State violence should not be within
the scope of the Convention. In an effort to dampen the resulting criticisms,
language providing for the State-actor exclusion was put forward that
implied (without really stating) that such exclusion was not tantamount to
an endorsement of impunity for State agents. The text circulated by the
Coordinator as a basis for negotiation reads:
1. Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States, peoples and individuals under international law,
in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, and international humanitarian law.
2. The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms
are understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed
by that law, are not governed by this Convention.
3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the
exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are governed by other
rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.2 5
The Coordinator borrowed the language of this "military carve-out"
(as it is known in diplomatic jargon) from the Terrorist Bombings
Convention, 26 although the 271979 Hostages Convention provided an earlier
precedent to similar effect. To make clear the legal terrain navigated by
In this case, including the Secretary-General: see In Larger Freedom, n.19 above,
para.91 at p.26 (stating that "[i]t is time to set aside debates on so-called 'State terrorism').
25 "Texts relating to article 18 of the draft comprehensive convention," in 2002 Ad Hoc
24

Committee Report, supra note 1, at Annex IV. This text served equally as the basis for the
28 March - 1 April 2004 discussions.
26
Article 19 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention reads as follows:
Nothing in this Convention shall affect other rights, obligations and
responsibilities of States and individuals under international law, in particular the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international
humanitarian law.
The activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are
understood under international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law,
are not governed by this Convention, and the activities undertaken by military
forces of a State in the exercise of their official duties, inasmuch as they are
governed by other rules of international law, are not governed by this Convention.
1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 10, at art. 19.
27 1979 Hostages Convention, supra note 10, at art. 12. This provision is discussed in
detail below.
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the Coordinator's text and the importance of the issues that arise, the
following discussion will focus first on paragraph two of the Coordinator's
text, which is limited to situations of armed conflict, and then will turn to
paragraph three, which has broader application.
Upon a first reading of the Coordinator's second paragraph, the
proposal to exclude "the activities of armed forces during an armed
conflict" by duplicating Article 19 of the Terrorist Bombings Convention
might seem unproblematic. It is true, for example, that in situations of
armed conflict the rules of international humanitarian law - whatever their
problems of practical application - provide a fairly fine-grained tissue of
norms related to prohibited conduct, as well as a growing body of
jurisprudence for the regulation of conduct during hostilities. Leaving
armed conflict situations to the exclusive regulation of this law might
therefore seem entirely justified. However, such an initial impression would
be deceptive for two reasons.
The first relates to the unlimited nature of the proposed exclusion for
conduct of armed forces "governed" by "humanitarian law". One could
Convention 28
note by comparison that the language of the 1979 Hostages
avoided the vagueness of such a reference and required instead, as a
precondition to the exclusion of the Hostages Convention's norms, that the
Geneva Conventions be applicable to the particularact in question and that
the State be under an obligation to prosecute or to hand over the
individual(s) involved. This ensures not just that there are norms governing
the area but that they require a specifically penal response.
That activities of armed forces are "governed" by humanitarian law
might mean significantly less than this, particularly in situations of noninternational armed conflict. 29 To thus exclude armed forces (and notably
28

1979 Hostages Convention, supranote 10, at art. 12:

In so far as the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of war victims or
the Additional Protocols to those Conventions are applicable to a particular act of
hostage-taking, and in so far as States Parties to this Convention are bound under
those conventions to prosecute or hand over the hostage-taker, the present
Convention shall not apply to an act of hostage-taking committed in the course of
armed conflicts as defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols
thereto, including armed conflicts mentioned in article 1, paragraph 4, of
Additional Protocol I of 1977, in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self- determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.
29 For example, Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, applicable to international armed
conflict applies the "extradite or prosecute" obligations characteristic of the grave breaches
regime of the 1949 Conventions to the Hague Law norms that regulate the targeting of
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those of States) in time of armed conflict from inter alia the extradite or
prosecute regime of the Comprehensive Convention would be to lose an
opportunity to introduce clear and rigorous norms into the normative
framework that determines how States respond to violations taking place
within internal armed conflict - an as yet underdeveloped area of IHL. Of
course, such an argument may be open to the objection that the adoption of
a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism is intended to
strengthen norms against terrorism, not to change or improve policy choices
made in the course of developing international humanitarian law. This may
be true; but if it is true, the principle should be applied consistently, since it
is precisely such changes to IHL policy that a Comprehensive Convention
would introduce with respect to non-State actors (as explained below).
The second and more serious concern relates to the restriction of the
Coordinator's (and Terrorist Bombings Convention's) text to "armed
30
forces". Such an exclusion covers the main State actors, but not all others
civilians and other methods and means of warfare (and which are incorporated within the
substantive provisions of this Protocol), ensuring that an ample scope of humanitarian law is
"governed" by norms that require individual criminal accountability: Additional Protocol
I,
supra note 4, at art. 85(3) & (4). The same is not true of internal conflicts. Thus, Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions was not covered by the grave breaches regime
establishing individual responsibility, and Additional Protocol II, supra note 4, does nothing
to extend such a regime to acts committed in internal armed conflict. Thus, while such acts
are increasingly affirmed as being criminal according to customary international law (based
on their inclusion in the Rome Statute and on the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR), it is
normally assumed that, while customary law creates permissive or optional universal
jurisdiction for international crimes, it does not carry over the firm "extradite or prosecute"
obligations familiar from the treaty regime: For further information see supra note 15.
30 "Armed forces" are defined in art. 43(1) of Additional Protocol I as comprising:
"The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed forces,
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the
conduct or its subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or
an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce
compliance with the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict."
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, at art. 43(1).
"Party" here refers either to a High Contracting Party, i.e. a State, or exceptionally
to forces representing "peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of selfdetermination" as envisioned by art. 1(4) of this Protocol. Id. at art. 1(4).
Additional Protocol II does not contain a definition of "armed forces" as such,
although it does refer to "armed conflicts ... which take place in the territory of a
High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or
other organized armed groups . . . under responsible command" in art. 1(1),
implying that the adverse party in an internal armed conflict may or may not
comprise "armed forces". Additional Protocol II, supranote 4, at art. 1(1).
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(non-State armed groups not reaching the standard of "armed forces", as
well as civilians who become directly involved in hostilities, particularly in
situations of non-international armed conflict). Such non-State actors would
simultaneously be exposed to both the Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism and IHL. This area of overlap would create friction
between the provisions of international humanitarian law and the
Comprehensive Convention and, more fundamentally, a dissonance
between the policies underlying each. This friction is seen most clearly
when one realizes, for example, that the acts of non-State armed groups
engaged in (probably internal) armed conflict could be labeled as terrorist
when the group engaged in e.g. targeting of government installations which might be legitimate military objectives under IHL when attacked by
armed forces - with the ultimate intent of forcing the national government
to grant autonomy to their region. 31 From a humanitarian law perspective,
this kind of attack is a classic example of the type of scenario intended to
fall within Additional Protocol II's exhortation that national governments at
the conclusion of internal armed conflicts grant to the participants in
32
A
opposition armed groups the broadest possible amnesty.
instead
that
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
imposed on States Parties the obligation to prosecute or extradite such
participants in internal conflicts would undermine this rule of IHL - a rule
which has an important role in ensuring the return to normalcy in the postconflict period - would potentially give non-State groups a strong incentive
to block or delay peace negotiations, and would criminalize what might
33
have been lawful acts under the laws of war. To avoid this interference
with what the vast majority of the international community probably
continues to view as the legitimate policy objectives of IHL, it would be far
better to create a more absolute separation between IHL and international
counter-terrorist law. This would be one result of what the Organization of
the Islamic Conference proposed during the 2001-2002 negotiations of the
Comprehensive Convention as a variation on paragraph two of the
Coordinator's discussion text:
2. The activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in
situations of foreign occupation, as those terms are understood under
31 See

n.23 above and related text.

"At the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest
possible amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived
of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or
detained." Additional Protocol II, supra note 4, at art. 6(5).
33 Even if a State Party to the Comprehensive Convention that was engaged in an internal
armed conflict chose to ignore its obligations to prosecute the "terrorist" crimes of its
citizens in order to promote the end of the conflict, other States Parties would continue to be
obliged to extradite or prosecute those individuals if they appeared on their territory.
32

2004]

STATE ACTORS IN TERRORISM

international humanitarian law, which are governed by that law, are not
34
governed by this Convention.
Obviously this proposal has other purposes (namely, to ensure that
situations of foreign occupation are understood as included within "armed
conflict", no doubt with an eye to the Palestine/Israel conflict), but the
greater breadth of its exclusion (expressly covering both State and nonState parties to a conflict, and thus encompassing in particular more
situations of non-international armed conflict) would essentially leave
international humanitarian law to deal with conduct in armed conflicts and
international counter-terrorist law to deal with conduct in times of peace.35
To conclude with respect to the second paragraph of the Coordinator's
2001-2002 discussion text - and while recognizing that IHL could bear
further improvement with respect to its enforcement - on balance it appears
best to leave the area of armed conflict outside the range of a
Comprehensive Convention with respect to all parties (indeed, of all
participants) to any such conflicts. To the extent that the overall design of
international humanitarian law represents policy choices concerning how to
deal with armed conflict to which the international community is still
committed, the adoption of a provision such as that just examined would
represent a serious revision of those policies by criminalizing conduct
viewed through the sole lens of "terrorism" where it might otherwise be
dealt with by more a nuanced and appropriate range of concepts and
mechanisms in the context of IHL.
Essentially the same criticism applies where paragraph 3 of the
Coordinator's text above is concerned. Here, the language borrowed from
the Terrorist Bombings Convention would exclude from the coverage of an
eventual Comprehensive Convention activities of the military forces of a
State in the exercise of their official duties "inasmuch as they are governed
by other rules of international law". Here the over-breadth of the word
"governed" is manifest. The "other rules of international law" that
"govern"
here would include a wide range of norms, from the prohibitions of
genocide and crimes against humanity to the regional and international
instruments of human rights law (as applicable), as well as the fundamental
human rights norms protected under customary law. The results flowing
34 2002 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 1, at Annex IV (emphasis added).
35 Presumably the term "armed forces" would encompass the "dissident
armed forces"
mentioned in Art. 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, at art. 1(4) while the OIC
language referring to "parties" would expand this to include the "other organized armed
groups." It appears however that not even the OIC language would encompass less
"organized" fighting formations, leaving such individuals to be labeled as terrorists in
application of the CCIT (which might be justified in some cases, but not in others); to avoid
this anomaly and leave the whole area of armed conflict to IHL, the exclusion would have to
use "all those who directly engage in hostilities" or a similar formulation.
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from such norms vary widely. If a given act of terrorism amounted to a
crime of genocide or torture, then the 1948 Genocide Convention or the
1985 Convention against Torture would require the State to establish
36
jurisdiction over and prosecute the offense. No such conventional
obligation exists with respect to crimes against humanity (although the
argument for a customary law obligation to the same effect is certainly
strong). Moreover, of these crimes, only with torture does a clear
conventional obligation to extradite in the event of a failure to prosecute
arise, while with genocide and crimes against humanity the view of the
majority of commentators is that only a permissive universal jurisdiction
exists at customary international law, without any "extradite or prosecute"
impunity.
obligation to serve as a bulwark against
As for human rights norms, their rules may "govern" a situation at a
considerable level of generality, with potential enforcement often through
only the sporadic and relatively weak supervision of international oversight
bodies with their reporting requirements, special rapporteurs and sometimes
visiting rights. Notwithstanding the important role that such supervision has
to play, its weaknesses are well known and will not be outlined here.
Moreover, it has typically been in situations that do not clearly meet the
threshold of armed conflict, but which are not quite situations of
'normality' - labeled variously as "states of emergency", "gray zone
conflicts" or "states of exception" - that human rights are most flagrantly
abused by States. This abuse often either closely resembles terrorism itself
or takes place while the government in question is invoking a battle against
terrorists to legitimate their actions, and often takes place within the legal
framework of 'national security' legislation that grants
38 wide discretion and
forces.
security
of
oversight
judicial
reduces effective
The legacy of efforts to improve respect for human rights in 'gray
zone' conflicts or states of emergency by increasing international regulation
of these situations is substantial, and might arguably be one of the most
important ongoing contemporary objectives in the field of human rights.
36 Such obligations are imposed, with respect to the 1948 Genocide Convention, supra
note 8, at arts. 5 & 6, for crimes taking place within the State Party's own territory, and with
respect to the Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at arts. 4 & 5, for crimes taking
place within the territory of all States Parties.
37 For further information see supra note 15.
38 Tom Hadden & Colin Harvey, The Law of Internal Crisis and Conflict: An Outline
Prospectusfor the Merger of InternationalHuman Rights Law, the Law of Armed Conflict,
Refugee Law, and the Law of HumanitarianIntervention, 833 INT'L R. OF THE RED CROSS

119 (1999); U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 29, States of Emergency (Article
4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001); Minimum Humanitarian Standards:
Analytic Report of the Secretary-General submitted pursuant to Commission on Human

Rights Resolution 1997/21, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/1998/87 (1998); Jean-Daniel Vigny &
Cecilia Thompson, Standards Fondamentaux d'Humanitg: Quel avenir?, 840 INT'L R. OF
rHE RED CROSS 917 (2000).
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This impetus towards the progressive development of international human
rights protection is undermined to the extent that States are not held to
account for what they do in situations of exception. This is precisely what
an overbroad exemption to the application of a Comprehensive Convention
would condone, inasmuch as it would leave to the soft mechanisms of
international human rights law the abuses committed by State actors, while
imposing a far more stringent framework of obligations on non-State actors
for what might be precisely the same types of conduct. One cannot really
argue that this sanctions impunity for the conduct of State actors, since they
remain subject to an extensive tissue of human rights norms, but it certainly
foregoes a rare opportunity to impose increased international obligations
and increased international scrutiny on States with respect to an important
area of international concern. In this respect, the Coordinator's text would,
like the Terrorist Bombings Convention before it, leave a serious void.39 If
governments were serious about adopting an instrument that would
contribute to the suppression of political violence as such, and by
whomever committed, this text would be seen as unacceptably broad. n
39 It should be noted here that the threshold defining the application of
the proposed
Comprehensive Convention does not exclude acts committed by a government against its
own nationals and in its own territory if the accused leaves the jurisdiction of that State.
Article 3 as currently drafted reads:

This Convention shall not apply where the offence is committed within a single
State, the alleged offender and the victims are nationals of that State, the alleged
offender is found in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis under
article 6, paragraph 1 [mandatory jurisdiction over crimes by a national, on the
territory, or on board a ship or aircraft of the State], or article 6, paragraph 2
[optional jurisdiction inter alia over crimes against a national, a facility abroad, of
the State], of this Convention to exercise jurisdiction, except that the provisions of
articles 8 and 12 to 16 [inter-state cooperation obligations] shall, as appropriate,
apply in those cases. 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.
When the accused leaves the jurisdiction of the crime and this paragraph becomes
inapplicable, article 6(4) becomes relevant:
Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 2 in cases where
the alleged offender is present in its territory and where it does not extradite such
a person to any of the States Parties that have established their jurisdiction in
accordance with paragraphs 1 or 2. Id. at art. 6(4).
Thus, even isolated acts in a single-State scenario are subject to the "extradite or prosecute"
obligation, except to the extent that a "military carve out" is adopted: "Texts of articles 3 to
17 bis and 20 to 27 of the draft comprehensive convention, prepared by the Friends of the
Chairman", 2002 Ad Hoc Committee Report, supra note 1, at Annex III. The language is
borrowed virtually verbatim from the Terrorist Bombings Convention, articles 3 and 6; the
Terrorist Financing Convention, supranote 10, at arts. 3 and 7, are to the same effect.
40 The third paragraph of the OIC recommendation, supra note 32, addresses this:
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Here, two nuances must be introduced. The first pertains to the
wording of paragraph 3 of the Coordinator's text above where, like the
Terrorist Bombing Convention, it would define the military exclusion
clause by reference to the "activities undertaken by the military forces of a
State in the exercise of their official duties". A debate has, of course, been
sparked by the United Kingdom's House of Lords proceedings in the
Pinochet affair 41 on the question of what constitutes the exact scope of the
official duties of State personnel and, more importantly, whether crimes
42
prohibited under international law can ever form a part of such duties. If
such crimes could not form part of such official duties as a matter of
international law, then the third paragraph of the Coordinator's text would
presumably open the door to the argument that all "terrorist" crimes of State
actors were subject to the Comprehensive Convention's provisions. The
view that would exclude international crimes from the scope of the 'official
functions' of State actors has recently been lent some support, in the
context of defining the immunities available in the face of such crimes, by
the separate concurring decision of three judges in the International Court
of Justice's Belgian arrest warrant case. Yet despite the hopeful
assertions of these distinguished judges, the Pinochet case itself cannot be
said uniformly to support the view that international crimes are outside the
scope of what international law recognizes as the official acts of State
44
functionaries, and the more widely held view remains to the contrary.
Assuming the same logic is valid in determining the applicability of
counter-terrorist conventions as applies in determining the scope of official
immunities, the proposed exclusion clause of the Comprehensive
3. The activities undertaken by the military forces of a State in the exercise of

their official duties, inasmuch as they are in conformity with international law, are
not governed by this Convention [emphasis added]. 2002 Ad Hoc Committee
Report, supra note 1, at Annex IV.
Of course, since virtually no acts of terrorism by State agents could be in
conformity with international law, this proposed amendment to the Coordinator's
text is the effective equivalent to its deletion.
41 R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, Ex parte Pinochet
Ugarte (Amnesty Int'l & Others intervening) (No. 3), [1999] 2 All E.R. 97 (H.L.).
42 j. Craig Barker, The Futureof Former Head of State Immunity after Ex parte Pinochet,
48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 937 (1999); Eileen Denza, Ex parte Pinochet: Lacuna or Leap?, 48
INT'L. CoMp. L.Q. 949 (1999); John Hopkins, Case and Comment: FormerHead ofForeign
State: Extradition;Immunity, 58 CAMBRIDGE. L.J. 461 (1999), Ruth Wedgwood,
InternationalCriminalLaw andAugusto Pinochet,40 VA. J. INT'L L. 829 (2000).
43 Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121
(Feb. 14,) , General List No. 121, Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooimans,
Buergenthal,at para.85.
44 The author details his own close analysis of this question in BROOMHALL, supra note 12,
at 133-134.
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Convention will ensure that the large bulk of terrorist acts committed by the
military forces of a State will remain outside the scope of the Convention. 45
The second nuance bears on the wording of article 1(4) of the Terrorist
Bombings Convention:
"Military forces of a State" means the armed forces of a State which are
organized, trained and equipped under its internal law for the primary
purpose of national defence or security, and persons acting in support of
those armed forces who are under their formal command, control and
responsibility. 46
This definition excludes from the "military carve out", and therefore
includes within the Convention's ordinary scope of application, acts by
States agents that do not form part of the "military forces of a State" as here
defined. This would appear to give the assurance that only the State's
military forces would be left to the "governance" of international
humanitarian law (in wartime), or of international criminal and international
human rights law (in times both of war and of peace), while police, internal
security forces and internal intelligence services, as well as other agencies,
would be subject to the rules laid out in the Convention. Yet this distinction
is likely to be clearer on paper than in practice. Governments engaged in the
repression of their own populations are prone to invoke national security or
foreign infiltration in attempted justification for their actions, and the
distinction between 'external' military forces and 'internal' police services
is highly porous in a great many countries where these bodies are either
structurally inter-woven or where the former is called in to supplement the
latter, whether to provide added capacity on a routine basis or in response to
real or perceived emergencies. The definition of "military forces of a State"
from the Terrorist Bombing Convention contemplates excluding these
forces notwithstanding this dual function through its reference to the
primary purpose of the forces. The result in practice, for purposes of the
exclusion from the Terrorist Bombings Convention or the proposed
Comprehensive Convention, would be to exclude from the relevant
convention's obligations the conduct of what is all too often a key player in
situations of internal repression. It also creates an anomaly inasmuch as it
would make police, internal security and various para-police forces subject
45 Of course, the scope of "official duties" in the Comprehensive Convention
context

would ultimately be determined (if ever) through the dispute resolution processes of the
proposed Convention (i.e. initially through diplomatic channels, secondly through arbitration
and, finally, through decision of the International Court of Justice). 2002 Ad Hoc Committee
Report, supranote 1, at Annex III, art. 23.
46 1997 Terrorist Bombings Convention, supra note 10, at art. 1(4). Discussion paper
draft Article 1(2) of the draft Comprehensive Convention is identical: 2002 Ad Hoc
Committee Report, supra note 1, at Annex I.
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inter alia to the obligation to extradite or prosecute the individuals in
question, while leaving untouched the military personnel who might in fact
have been working alongside or even informally directing them on the
grounds that the latter are "under [the] formal command, control and
responsibility" of the military forces of the State. In the face of this
disparity of treatment, the fact that the States involved are subject to
obligations to respect and ensure international human rights norms with
respect to the conduct of the excluded military officials seems cold comfort.
The logic of the above arguments dictates that, if Member States of the
United Nations are determined to adopt a Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism, the second paragraph of the Coordinator's text
above should nevertheless respect more fully the rules and principles of
humanitarian law by excluding both the armed forces of the State and nonState combatants from the coverage of the Convention, while the
Coordinator's third paragraph should be deleted entirely. The latter measure
would result in the inclusion of State terrorism in "gray zone" conflicts or
states of emergency, thus responding to and commemorating the many
abuses that ravaged countries inter alia in Central and South American in
the late 20 th century. Rather than being an inheritor of tradition of the socalled 'national security' legislation that has so often been used to justify
the abrogation of the rule of law and abuses of human rights, a principled
approach to armed conflict and to the responsibility of State actors - if
accompanied by sufficient attention to issues relating to the overbreadth of
the definition 47 - would serve to increase the legitimacy of the
Comprehensive Convention, and might eventually intensify the light that
international law casts into places that some might prefer be left in the dark.
As advisable as the course of action just prescribed might be, it may well be
for precisely this latter reason that the government of the United States,
among others, opposes the inclusion of State terrorism in a Comprehensive
Convention.
V. Conclusion
Of course, to the extent that some of the objections just enunciated
focus on the potentially "lost opportunity" to impose clearer obligations or
clearer means of enforcement on States with respect to the abuses of their
own personnel than currently exist at international law, it might be said in
47 In essence, it is the author's view that the draft definition currently under discussion (n.23

above and related text) should eliminate its reference to purely economic harm and should
impose restrictions on the reference to property damage (perhaps by requiring a link to harm
to persons), thus shifting the emphasis towards the death and serious bodily harm that is
normally associated with terrorism. Both the Secretary-General and the High-Level Panel
focused on such harm in their expressions of support for a comprehensive definition: In
6
LargerFreeedom, n.19 above, para. 91 at p.2 ; A More Secure World, n.19 above, para. 164
52
p. .
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response that if the Comprehensive Convention fails to deal with these
matters then future efforts aimed at the progressive development of
international law or at the reduction of impunity for serious crimes could
take up these issues. This may be true in a theoretical way, but experience
tends to show that opportunities to advance international law have to be
taken up when they present themselves if sometimes decades-long intervals
are not to intervene.
Perhaps more importantly, if more intangibly, the adoption of a
Comprehensive Convention aimed largely at the conduct of non-State
actors would appear likely to reinforce a distinction common to the political
discourse of States engaged in real or ostensible counter-terrorist
campaigns. This is, namely, the tendency to characterize the conduct of
non-State opponents as "terrorist" while depicting the State's own conduct
as purely defensive of the "public order" or "national security". It need
hardly be said that of course States sometimes are engaged in genuine
counter-terrorist campaigns where defensive motives are genuinely in play,
but there is a wide penumbra of situations in which these characterizations
are deployed for essentially illegitimate political purposes. The draft
definition of a crime of terrorism currently under discussion threatens to
reinforce this tendency by imposing on all States Parties to the
Comprehensive Convention the obligation to cooperate in the prosecution
of a wide range of offences that might represent lawful acts of war
committed in internal armed conflict or which might represent legitimate
acts of dissent or resistance when committed in peacetime (including in
states of exception). Among the latter situations, one thinks for example of
a group of indigenous people engaging in sabotage of installations intruding
into lands for which they are seeking autonomy in the face of an oppressive
central government. In such situations, a good portion the international
community might see the struggle as in line with overall international
trends towards democracy or the rule of law. Nonetheless, by having
ratified the Comprehensive Convention, these States would be left with the
choice either of ignoring their treaty obligations - undermining the
legitimacy of the Convention and perhaps in time rendering it a dead letter
- or of adopting a repressive criminal-law approach contrary to their wider
international public policy objectives. In this respect, to adopt the
Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism as currently
designed would represent a choice by the international community of an
extremely blunt policy instrument likely to have serious negative
repercussions for a long time to come.

